Etiqueta: banco

  • Decapitación para los banqueros insolventes

    Banking in Catalonia in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries: The Taula de Canvi

    The emergence of private banks in Barcelona coincided with the development of private banking in large Italian business centers. During the reign of Jaime I, the Conqueror, (1213-1276), the Gothic and Roman laws governing business were repealed and replaced by the Usos de Barcelona. In addition, a thorough, detailed set of regulations to control banking was established by the Cortes of 1300-1301. It set down the powers, rights, and responsibilities of bankers, and stipulated requirements with respect to guarantors. Some of the rules adopted are quite relevant to our topic.

    For example, on February 13, 1300 it was established that any banker who went bankrupt would be vilified throughout Barcelona by a public spokesman and forced to live on a strict diet of bread and water until he returned to his creditors the full amount of their deposits. [Usher, The Early History of Deposit Banking in Mediterranean Europe, p. 239.] Furthermore, on May 16, 1301, one year later, it was decided that bankers would be obliged to obtain collateral or guarantees from third parties in order to operate, and those who did not would not be allowed to spread a tablecloth over their work counter. The purpose was to make clear to everyone that these bankers were not as solvent as those using tablecloths, who were backed by collateral. Any banker who broke this rule (i.e., operated with a tablecloth but without collateral) would be found guilty of fraud. [Ibid., p. 239.] In view of these regulations, Barcelona’s banking system must initially have been quite solvent and banks must have largely respected the essential legal principles governing the monetary bank deposit.

    Nevertheless, there are indications to show that, in spite of everything, private bankers soon began to deceive their clients, and on August 14, 1321 the regulations pertaining to bank failures were modified. It was established that those bankers who did not immediately fulfill their commitments would be declared bankrupt, and if they did not pay their debts within one year, they would fall into public disgrace, which would be proclaimed throughout Catalonia by a town crier. Immediately afterward, the banker would be beheaded directly in front of his counter, and his property sold locally to pay his creditors. In fact, this is one of the few historical instances in which public authorities have bothered to effectively defend the general principles of property rights with respect to the monetary bank-deposit contract. While it is likely that most Catalonian bankers who went bankrupt tried to escape or pay their debts within a year, documentary evidence shows that at least one banker, a certain Francesch Castello, was beheaded directly in front of his counter in 1360, in strict accordance with the law. [65 Ibid., pp. 240 and 242. In light of recent scandals and bank crises in Spain, one could jokingly wonder if it might not be a good idea to again punish fraudulent bankers as severely as in fourteenth-century Catalonia. A student of ours, Elena Sousmatzian, says that in the recent bank crisis that devastated Venezuela, a senator from the Social-Christian Party Copei even «seriously» suggested such measures in a statement to the press. Incidentally, her remarks were quite well-received among depositors affected by the crisis.]

    Despite these sanctions, banks’ liquid funds did not match the amount received on demand deposit. As a result, they eventually failed en masse in the fourteenth century, during the same economic and credit recession that ravaged the Italian financial world and was studied by Carlo M. Cipolla. Though there are signs that Catalonian banks held out a bit longer than Italian ones (the terrible penalties for fraud undoubtedly raised reserve ratios), documents show that in the end, Catalonian banks also generally failed to meet their obligations. In March 1397, further regulations were introduced when the public began to complain that bankers were reluctant to return money deposited, offered their clients all sorts of excuses, told them to «come back later» and would pay them (in the end, if the clients were lucky) only in small coins of little value and never in the gold which had originally been deposited. [Ibid., p. 244.]

    The bank crisis of the fourteenth century did not lead to increased monitoring and protection of the property rights of depositors. Instead, it resulted in the creation of a municipal government bank, the Taula de Canvi, Barcelona’s Bank of Deposit. This bank was formed with the purpose of taking in deposits and using them to finance city expenditures and the issuance of government bond certificates for the city of Barcelona. Hence, the Taula de Canvi fits the traditional model of a bank created by public authorities to take direct advantage of the dishonest profits of banking.

  • Suspensión de pagos del Banco de Barcelona

    No hubo, en general, sorpresa: venían circulando graves rumores sobre la vieja e importante entidad; la seguridad producida por los dividendos distribuidos en el año 1919 estuvo minada por la sospecha de los excesos atribuidos a la sucursal abierta in el paseo de Gracia. Ni fue, para la mayoría, el fallo de «otro banco», ni lo ocurrido pudo explicarse como un fenómeno normal de postguerra. «A mucha gente, y todavía más a la de caudales modestos -escribe Hurtado-, les hizo el efecto de la muerte de alguien de la familia. Desde una larga serie de generaciones el Banco era una parte integrante de la ciudad… (En) aquella famosa sucursal aparecían unos nombres como beneficiarios de unos créditos fabulosos que nunca habían obtenido las mejores firmas catalanas. Dejando a un lado una docena de aprovechados entre el personal subalterno, no podía decirse que fuese la inmoralidad de los gestores la que había escamoteado la gran fortuna desaparecida, sino el afán de exprimir el crédito del Banco para hacerle rendir la máxima substancia, y la ineptidud de una gente improvisada que, al querer ensayar los procedimientos expeditivos de los grandes bancos modernos de disponibilidades inagotables, lo había aplastado con sus manos inexpertas».

    Cambó compareció al día siguiente…: y otra vez contra el pánico que tal suspensión había desencadenado. «La crisis formidable que hace tambalear hoy toda nuestra economía es la crisis más injustificada, más irracional, más evitable de cuantas se hayan producido en el mundo. Nunca, Barcelona y Cataluña habían acumulado la riqueza que hoy tienen… Pero el pánico desencadenado los últimos días, lo pone todo en peligro». Volvía sobre los deberes del Gobierno y del Banco de España: «No se evitan las crisis económicas, pero se eviten, con una actuación del poder público y del banco de emisión, las crisis financieras, que siempre vienen determinadas por un pánico…». Por otra parte, en Cataluña, debían obtenerse trascendentales enseñanzas: «Esta crisis ha de significar el fin del individualismo en nuestra organización bancaria… Es preciso que no se pierda un momento en recriminaciones estériles…».

  • Misterioso asalto al Banco Central

    «A lo largo de 36 horas», dice un grupo de rehenes consultados por EL PAIS, «los asaltantes no demostraron interés alguno por el dinero. Siempre tuvimos la sensación de que era lo que menos les importaba. Tuvieron a su disposición, antes de apilar el dinero de los sótanos, donde había ochocientos millones, cincuenta millones que estaban en las ventanillas de caja del primer piso. Desde el primer momento llegaron preparados para una larga estancia». Ni el momento ni el lugar elegidos por los asaltantes del Banco Central de Barcelona parecen los más adecuados para un golpe en que únicamente se busque el dinero.

  • Robo atrevido en el Banco Hispano Americano en c/ Fontanella

    Un grupo de atracadores penetró … en la cámara acorazada de la sucursal del Banco Hispano Americano en la calle de Fontanella, de Barcelona, apoderándose del contenido de unas 1.000 de cajas de seguridad.